Respecting Commitment:  A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals by Holob, Marissa J.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 84
Issue 5 July 1999 Article 19
Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent
Legal Barriers from Obstructing the Effectuation of
Intestate Goals
Marissa J. Holob
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marissa J. Holob, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals ,
84 Cornell L. Rev. 1492 (1999)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol84/iss5/19
NOTE
RESPECTING COMMITMENT:
A PROPOSAL TO PREVENT LEGAL BARRIERS FROM
OBSTRUCTING THE EFFECTUATION
OF INTESTATE GOALS
Marissaf Holob
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1493
I. INTESTACY LAWS .......................................... 1496
A. History and Development ........................... 1496
B. Modem Intestacy Laws ............................. 1498
1. General Policies of Probate Codes ................... 1499
2. Donative Intent and the Changing Family .......... 1501
3. Summary of Policy ................................ 1502
II. TBE RIGHTS OF DoMEsTc PARTNERS ..................... 1503
A. Opposite-Sex Partners .............................. 1503
B. Same-Sex Couples .................................. 1505
C. Summary of Rights ................................. 1508
II. Tim PUBLIC POLICY Vawponr .......................... 1509
A. Arguments Based on Probate Code Policies ......... 1509
B. Arguments Based on Public Attitudes and
Actions ............................................. 1512
C. Argument Based on the Ability to Define
Committed Partners ................................ 1515
D. Summ ary ........................................... 1516
IV. ATTEMPTS AT FULFILLING INTESTATE POLICIES ............ 1516
A. Existing Law ........................................ 1516
B. Attempts at Statutory Revision ...................... 1518
C. Another Approach: Reciprocal Benefits ............. 1522
D. Colorado's Attempt: Registration of Committed
Partners ............................................ 1523
E. A More Comprehensive Approach .................. 1526
CONCLUSION ................................................... 1528
1492
2000] RESPECTING COMMITMENT 1493
INTRODUGrION
The power of perpetuating our property in our families is one of the most
valuable and interesting circumstances belonging to it, and that which tends
most to the perpetuation of society itself
-Edmund Burke'
The structure of the American family has changed dramatically
over the past several decades.2 The traditional family, consisting of
the bread-winning husband, the homemaking wife, and their two bio-
logical children, still exists but in ever decreasing numbers.5 The di-
vorce rate has increased and many families now include stepchildren.4
In addition, more people, such as same-sex couples, are choosing al-
ternative lifestyles, such as cohabiting with their partner in a
nonmarital domestic partnership.5
1 EDMUND BuRKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 8 THE WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BuRKE 53, 102 (Paul Langford ed., Clarendon Press 1989) (1791).
2 See Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation ofInheritance
Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 353, 353 (1988) (noting that "[a] wide
variety of other types of communal living arrangements are becoming more common");
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple- Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform
Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROS. & Ta. J. 683, 685-87 (1992) (noting that "divorce rates
are astonishingly high and remarriage abounds" and that "[l]esbian, gay, and unmarried
heterosexual couples, sometimes with children, constitute unmistakable parts of the Amer-
ican family scene" (footnotes omitted)).
3 One study discovered that the husband is the sole breadwinner in only ten percent
of American families. See D.C. COMM'N ON DoMSTrc PARTNERSHIP BENEFrrS FOR D.C.
GOV'T EMPLOYEES, 1 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (1990).
4 See Waggoner, supra note 2, at 685-86.
5 See Lovas, supra note 2, at 353. Lovas writes:
The nontraditional family may consist of an unmarried couple, either ho-
mosexual or heterosexual, and either with or without the minor or adult
children of one or both partners; a single parent, with minor or adult chil-
dren; or a stepfamily, with the 'parents' either married or unmarried, with
minor or adult children from the prior marriages or relationships of one or
both of the 'parents,' and possibly with the joint children of the 'parents.'
Id. at 353 (footnotes omitted). The practice of cohabitation has become so commonplace
that the Census Bureau "coined the acronym POSSLQ ('partners of opposite sex sharing
living quarters') to describe this kind of living arrangement." Rebecca L. Melton, Note,
Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and EvolvingDefinitions of "Fam-
ily,"29J. FAm. L. 497, 499 (1991).
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A 1994 study found that domestic partnerships6 comprised about
seven percent of couples in the United States. 7 The study showed that
approximately thirty percent of these domestic partnerships were les-
bian or gay couples.8 With the increase in these relationships, signifi-
cant changes have occurred in society's attitudes regarding
cohabitation.9 Even though the law has to a limited extent recognized
nonmarital relationships, "[p] referential treatment of the traditional
family unit [still] pervades law and society . .. [,] discriminat[ing]
against people who do not live in traditional family settings."' 0 Do-
mestic partnership law is uncertain and often depends on the presid-
ing judge or particular jurisdiction. Domestic partners lack many
rights that are conferred upon married couples." For example, do-
mestic partners do not have the protection of divorce laws, 12 the abil-
ity to sue in tort for the loss of consortium,' 3 the right to make
medical decisions for each other,14 or immunity under evidence
laws. 15 A last and, for the purposes of this Note, most important area
6 Defining domestic partnerships raises many political, practical, and moral ques-
tions. This Note will use the term to mean a couple, whether homosexual or heterosexual,
who not only live together, but also share an emotional bond similar to that expected of
married couples. The difficulties with defining domestic partnerships in determining
whether the surviving partner of a decedent should inherit will be discussed later. See infra
Part III.C. This Note will use the terms domestic partner, committed couples, and
nonmarital couples interchangeably. All of these terms refer to a nontraditional, family-
type, intimate relationship. See also LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW
85 (1997) (defining domestic partners as those who are "sexually intimate and financially
interdependent").
7 See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study,
16 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 3 (1998).
8 See id.
9 See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 6, at 85 (noting half of the population under age
forty has lived with an unmarried partner at some point in their lives); Andrew Herrmann,
Breaking Up Is Not Hard To Do, Cm. SuN TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1999, at 25 (noting that the number
of unmarried couples living together increased from 439,000 in 1960 to 4.2 million in
1998).
10 Amy L. Brown, Note, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decision-
making for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASnNGS LJ. 1029, 1029 (1990).
11 See David L. Chambers, What if7 The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs
of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447, 447 (1996) ("Laws that treat married
persons in a different manner than they treat single persons permeate nearly every field of
social regulation in this country-taxation, torts, evidence, social welfare, inheritance,
adoption.").
12 See Mary N. Cameli, Extending Family Benefits to Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. Rxv. 447, 448-49 (1992).
13 See Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 269 (1988).
14 See Brown, supra note 10, at 1036-37 (noting that no state "statutes suggest that a
lover or close friend of the patient might.., be a better proxy decisionmaker than a legal
relative").
15 See WiLLIAm N. ESKRIUGEJR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIB-
ERTY TO CIVLIZED CoMMTuMENT 66 (1996). Eskridge includes a laundry list of rights en-
joyed by married couples but denied to domestic partners. See id. at 66-67.
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where domestic partners do not enjoy the same rights as married
couples is in the realm of intestacy laws. 16
Domestic partnerships are severely negatively affected by prop-
erty laws that insufficiently protect their interests. Estate planning is
an especially problematic area for nontraditional families.17 Many in-
dividuals, however, either fail to satisfactorily plan the disposition of
their estates or make an invalid will."' When individuals fail to plan
"either in the entirety or in an effective manner-[it] triggers applica-
tion of the laws of intestate succession." 19 Laws in the United States
are biased toward the traditional family2 0 and thus "[u] nless... volun-
tary protections have been created, the survivor of ... an unmarried
couple, homosexual or heterosexual, stands completely without inher-
itance rights."21 This preference is unjust, and thus current intestate
regulations conflict with the very policies they are supposed to ad-
vance. 22 In addition, as more and more couples choose alternative
family arrangements, current intestate succession laws adequately pro-
tect an increasingly smaller portion of society. Although significant
changes have occurred in intestate succession laws, these changes do
not satisfy all of the needs of domestic partners.
This Note argues that intestate succession laws should be ex-
tended to include domestic partners (unmarried but committed
couples). Part I focuses on the Uniform Probate Code, discussing the
history of intestacy laws and the policies behind modem intestacy stat-
utes. Part II examines the rights of unmarried couples. Part III con-
16 Cf Lovas, supra note 2, at 353 ("Although the traditional family is in the minority,
the statutes governing inheritance . . . are generally patterned after the traditional
family.").
17 See id. at 354 (discussing "special estate planning problems" of nontraditional fami-
lies, including the appropriate distribution of property, the minimization of death taxes,
custody battles of minors, medical care decisions, and funeral arrangements).
18 See Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions for
Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASrINGS L.J. 941, 943-44 & n.14 (1995).
19 Id. at 941 (footnote omitted).
20 See Thomas M. Hanson, Note, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren: California Leads the
Way, But Has It Gone Far Enough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 260 (1995) (noting that "the intes-
tacy laws of most states are still structured as if the traditional family is the dominant social
familial unit").
21 Lovas, supra note 2, at 363. In the current version of the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC), only spouses, parents, and descendants can recover under intestacy laws. See UMF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-103 (amended 1993), 8 U.LA. 81-84 (1998). Currently, no UPC
provisions grant a decedent's partner any intestacy rights. In Part IV.B, this Note will ana-
lyze Professor Robert Waggoner's proposal to revise the UPC to allow committed partners
to receive a portion of their deceased partners' estates.
22 Cf Brown, supra note 10, at 1029 ("Preferential treatment of the traditional family
unit pervades law and society. Usually this deference is innocuous. In certain situations,
however, it discriminates against people who do not live in traditional family settings, but
who instead have formed other types of primary relationships."). This Note discusses how
succession laws that ignore nontraditional families undermine their own underlying poli-
cies. See infra Part I.B, lI.A.
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siders the public policy considerations for extending inheritance
rights to domestic partners. Part IV analyzes several different methods
for granting an intestacy share to domestic partners.
I
INTESTACY LAWS
A. History and Development
"Man is mortal. But the things he owns do not disappear with
him. Once mankind... passed the stage in which a man's belongings
are destroyed or buried along with him at his death, the community
must see to it that they are allotted to a new owner."23 The develop-
ment of individual ownership gave rise to the desire to dispose of
property according to one's own wishes. Although documents resem-
bling wills have been in existence for five thousand years, the modem
American law of wills owes its origins to the Romans.2 4 The Romans
defined inheritance as "universal succession"25 and believed that the
inheritor did not simply represent the deceased but "continued his
civil life, his legal existence."26
After the Romans, "testamentary law continued under the aus-
pices of the Church."27 During this period, wills could be either writ-
ten or oral.28 In addition, will execution formalities did not exist, and
thus problems with fraud were prevalent.2 9 To solve these problems,
the state instituted laws governing the inheritance of property.30 This
development is evident today in American probate laws, in which the
"rights to intestate succession are almost wholly statutory."31
In the past, property distribution depended on the type of prop-
erty owned, the deceased's social status, where the deceased lived, and
the deceased's sex.32 The advent of feudalism brought about the pri-
23 MAX RHEINSTEIN & MARYANN GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' EsTATES 1 (1971).
24 See generally ALSON REPI. & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HIsTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACK-
GROUND OF THE LAW OF WiLLs: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 3
(1928) (discussing the existence of wills in ancient Egypt, as well as in Hebrew, Greek, and
Roman law).
25 , Judith N. Cates & Marvin B. Sussman, Family Systems and Inheritance, in FAMILY SyE-
TEMS AND INHERrrANcE PATTERNS 1, 2 (Judith N. Cates & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1982)
(discussing origins of Anglo-American inheritance law).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 3.
28 See REPPY & TOMPKiNS, supra note 24, at 8.
29 See id. at 9.
30 See id.
31 Hanson, supra note 20, at 262.
32 See generally REPPY & TompiNs, supra note 24, at 4-10 (tracing the law of wills and
testaments in England from the time of the Norman Conquest to the enactment of the
Wills Act of 1837).
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mogeniture system of inheritances,3 3 whereby all the land of wealthy
individuals passed directly to the eldest son.34 Personalty, however,
could pass to a decedent's spouse, child, or another of the decedent's
choosing by testamentary disposition.35
In 1676, England passed the Statute of Frauds. 36 It included for-
malities for making wills and severely limited the use of oral wills.37
Over a hundred years later, the Crown enacted the Statute of Wills
(Wills Act),38 allowing "every person to devise, bequeath or dispose of
by will all descendible real or personal estate which he owned... at
the time of death"3 9 as long as the formalities of execution were fol-
lowed. The Wills Act also set a minimum age requirement for testa-
mentary capacity, outlined the proper revocation of wills under
different circumstances (including marriage), and established re-
quirements for codicils, alterations, republication, and many other
contexts.40
In most of the United States "the law of wills is of English origin,
modified by statutes designed to meet local needs."41 Early British
common law of inheritance, as already noted, created separate rules
for land and personalty.42 In time, the British system evolved to allow
testamentary disposition of both land and personalty.43 In the United
States, however, individuals have always had the power to dispose of
both real and personal property as they saw fit.44 In addition, while
the British system historically focused on maintaining the social status
and welfare of widows and dependent family members, the American
system emphasized fulfilling a decedent's donative intent.45
The historical variations between U.S. and British probate laws
arose because conditions in the two countries were different.46 With
the development of a market economy in colonial America, feudal
33 See CAROLE SHAMMAS Er AL, INHFRrrANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PREsENT 24 (1987).
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See REI'IX" & TOMPKINS, supra note 24, at 9.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 14-15.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 14-17.
41 Id. at 47; see also SHAMMAs Er AL., supra note 33, at 30-31 (discussing the influence of
English probate laws on inheritance statutes in Colonial America).
42 See RrE'r, & TOMPKINS, supra note 24, at 47.
43 See SHAMMAs ET AL., supra note 33, at 26-27.
44 See REPPY & TOMPKINs, supra note 24, at 47 (noting that the United States has always
recognized "the power to make testamentary disposition of both real and personal
property").
45 See id.; RHEINSEIN & GLENDON, supra note 23, at 8.
46 See RErY & TOMPxNS, supra note 24, at 47.
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principles were not applicable.47 Because there was an abundance of
unclaimed land throughout our nation's history, the United States did
not attach as much importance to its ownership as the British did.48
In addition, the preference for male descendants over female de-
scendants in intestacy law began to erode in America during colonial
times, long before it did in England.49 This preference disappeared
because it "was considered incompatible with that equality.. . which it
is the constitutional policy of this country to preserve and inculcate."50
With an abhorrence of "aristocracy [and] family dynasties,"5' Ameri-
can probate codes developed by focusing on "individual freedom of
disposition."52
B. Modern Intestacy Laws
In the absence of a valid will, probate codes control inheritance
by dictating which family members receive what part of a decedent's
estate.53 In addition, most probate codes ensure that spouses receive
a guaranteed minimum percentage of the decedent's estate, regard-
less of any testimentary instruments to the contrary.54 While all state
probate codes differ, most are based at least in part on the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC). 55 Under the UPC, a decedent's surviving
spouse takes the entire estate if no parent of the decedent survives
and all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants
of the surviving spouse. 56 A surviving spouse receives a reduced por-
tion of the estate if a parent of the decedent survives,57 the surviving
spouse has surviving descendants who are not descendants of the de-
cedent,58 or the decedent has surviving descendants from someone
other than the surviving spouse. 59 If there is not a surviving spouse,
47 See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law of the Dead: Prop-
erty, Succession, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 340 (describing the history of intestacy in the
United States).
48 See id. at 360-61.
49 See WAGGONER Er AL., supra note 6, at 33.
50 REPr, & TomyamNs, supra note 24, at 81.
51 WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 6, at 33.
52 Id.
53 Under American common law, the spouse took the entire estate if the decedent
had no surviving issue or if the decedent's parents were dead. See id. at 37. If the decedent
had both a surviving spouse and surviving issue, the spouse usually received one-third of
the estate, and the children took the remaining two-thirds. See id. If the decedent had no
surviving issue but was survived by a parent and spouse, the surviving spouse and parents
usually split the estate, each receiving one-half. See id. at 38.
54 See Friedman, supra note 47, at 376.
55 See UNF. PROBATE CODE (amended 1993), 8 U.LA. (1998 & Supp. 1999).
56 See i& § 2-102(1).
57 See id. § 2-102(2).
58 See id. § 2-102(3).
59 See id. § 2-102(4).
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the estate descends to the decedent's descendants. 60 If there are no
surviving descendants, the decedent's parents share the estate.61 If
there are no surviving descendants and neither parent is alive, de-
scendants of the decendent's parents share the estate.62 If there are
no surviving descendants in that line, descendants of the decedent's
grandparents share the estate.63 Finally, if no heirs can be found, the
estate escheats to the state.64
1. General Policies of Probate Codes
The law favors freedom of testation because it is "conducive to
the achievement of certain socially desirable goals, such as the stimula-
tion of economic activity, ' 65 and it allows testators "to substitute for
the rigid formulas of intestate succession a plan adapted to the special
needs and the particular situation of each member of his family."6 6
Thus, in creating default rules, probate codes attempt to best approxi-
mate how most testators dispose of their estate when dying with a valid
will. 67 In other words, the function of probate courts and intestacy
statutes is to "secure the disposition of property under administration
as the owner, acting rationally, would have disposed of it if living."68
The Uniform Probate Code explicitly articulates this objective as
well. 69 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws initially developed the UPC to simplify and unify probate laws
throughout the country.70 A driving force behind the UPC is the goal
of providing "'suitable rules and procedures for the person of modest
means who relies on the estate plan provided by law."' 7 ' To accom-
plish this goal, the UPC prescribes default rules using prevailing pat-
60 See id. § 2-103(1).
61 See id. § 2-103(2).
62 See id. § 2-103(3).
63 See id. § 2-103(4).
64 See id. § 2-105.
65 RHEINSTEIN & GLENDON, supra note 23, at 55.
66 Id.
67 See Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Matters,
55 ALB. L. REv. 927, 929 (1992).
68 RFEPPY & ToMeeiNs, supra note 24, at 160.
69 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b) (2) (noting that a purpose of the UPC is "to
discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property").
70 See id. § 1-102(b) (1), (5) (noting that an "underlying purpose" of the UPC is to
"simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents" and to "make uniform the
law among the variousjurisdictions"). The inconsistency of probate laws from state to state
is particularly troublesome given the mobile nature of the will-making portion of the Amer-
ican population. For example, an individual could make a will which was valid in the state
of execution, but then move to another state following different probate requirements.
This inconsistency results in litigation and wasted time. The UPC attempts to minimize
this result. See id.
71 Fried, supra note 67, at 928-29 (quoting UNF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt
(1969)).
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terns in valid wills as a guide.72 In addition, the UPC advocates liberal
construction of its provisions to best "promote its underlying purposes
and policies."75
There are four major policies underlying intestacy laws in the
United States; the most important of which is fulfilling the decedent's
donative intent.74 Generally, testators may dispose of their property
in any manner they wish.75 Because of this principle's importance in
property law; it is natural to extend this principle to the disposition of
property when no will exists, further reflecting society's commitment
to donative freedom.76
Another goal of intestacy laws is ensuring the fair distribution of
property among family members. 77 Thus, probate codes seek to avoid
creating dissatisfaction among family members in the disposition of
an estate.78 While striving to achieve this goal, intestate probate laws
also try "to avoid complicating property ties and excessive subdivision
of property."79 This objective, however, is not as important as ensur-
ing that the law reflects a decedent's donative intent.80
A third objective of intestate laws is to promote societal interests,
including "protect[ing] the financially dependent family."8' Most
states have probate provisions ensuring spouses and minor children
receive at least some of the decedent's estate.8 2 In providing for the
72 See id.
73 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(a).
74 See RHEINSrEIN & GLENDON, supra note 23, at 24 (emphasizing that because the
"legislature is in effect making a will for the deceased" probate codes "ought to coincide as
far as possible with the probable wishes of the majority of people who die intestate").
75 See Friedman, supra note 47, at 355 ("[T]he general rule is... that the testator...
may make any disposition of his property he pleases."). There are a few exceptions to this
general rule. For example, a forced share exists for a widow in her husband's estate to
protect against disinheritance. In most states, a widow has the right to renounce her hus-
band's will and instead take a share of the estate dictated by law. See id. at 360.
76 See id. at 355. Friedman writes:
The intestacy laws can even be analyzed as an extension of the principle of
free disposition of property at death. These laws can be looked upon as
empirical recognition of the fact that most people choose close relatives as
heirs; the man who dies without a will may be voluntarily adopting the statu-
tory plan and saving himself trouble and legal fees.
Id. This Note will later argue that when an individual in a domestic partnership dies intes-
tate, probate laws should recognize that the decedent would most likely wish the surviving
partner to inherit at least part of the estate. See infra Parts III, IV.
77 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 12.
78 See id.
79 Lomenzo, supra note 18, at 947 (quoting Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes
About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM.
B. FouND. REs. J. 321, 324).
80 See id. (noting that the focus in "the law of descent is on the property owner and
not on the expectations of the surviving family members").
81 Id. (arguing that "protecting the financially dependent family... best serves soci-
ety's interests" (footnote omitted)).
82 See Friedman, supra note 47, at 376-77.
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distribution of property, intestacy statutes try to reflect changing
norms in society.83 Primogeniture, dower, and curtesy have given way
to a probate system that includes not only the surviving spouse, but
nonmarital and adopted children as well.8 4
The fourth major objective of intestacy laws is "to promote and
encourage the nuclear family."85 Difficulty arises, however, in trying
to define the term "family." Historically, society has valued the institu-
tion of the family-one consisting of a heterosexual, married couple
and their biological children-for its legal, social, and religious signif-
icance.86 In the past several decades, however, the configuration of
the family has undergone a dramatic change.87 Legal rights and obli-
gations under intestacy laws, however, have remained unchanged.
2. Donative Intent and the Changing Family
As previously mentioned, although intestacy laws try to effectuate
a decedent's donative intent, there are limits to this goal. For exam-
ple, all probate codes protect surviving spouses.88 Decedents cannot
fully disinherit their surviving spouse.8 9 This protection, however, is
only afforded to those falling within the category of "surviving
spouse."90 Probate law does not recognize a surviving domestic part-
ner as a surviving spouse for property distribution purposes.91 This
exclusion means "the surviving partner [is treated] as no more a natu-
ral object of the decedent's bounty than a complete stranger."92
The current system of property distribution is inflexible and out-
dated. Current intestacy laws do not take into account that the law
83 See Helene S. Shapo, "A Tale of Two Systems": Anglo-American Problems in the Moderni-
zation of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. Rnv. 707, 707 (1993).
84 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21,
34-35 (1994).
85 Lomenzo, supra note 18, at 947 (quoting Fellows et al., supra note 79, at 324).
86 See id
87 See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1164, 1165 n.5 (1992);
supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
88 See Waggoner, supra note 84, at 61.
89 See id. Probate laws guarantee a surviving spouse a portion of the decedent's estate,
but the surviving spouse is the only family member who receives this type of protection.
Surviving descendants, such as children, grandchildren, or surviving parents, can be disin-
herited. See WAccONER ET AT-, supra note 6, at 579 ("[C]hildren may be intentionally
disinherited.").
90 See Waggoner, supra note 84, at 23.
91 See David Margolick, Single or Living Together, HavingA Will Is Important, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 17, 1985, at C1 (arguing that in the absence of a will, "the state assumes that family
members, not friends, are the natural objects of one's bounty," and thus a surviving part-
ner is "at the mercy of the family, and it's up to them whether [the surviving partner] can
keep what is really [his or her] own property when the decedent partner dies").
92 Waggoner, supra note 84, at 63.
20001 1501
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
deals with "particular individuals in particular circumstances."93
Although acceptable a hundred years ago, it is not sufficient to pre-
sume that one's spouse or blood relations are the only natural objects
of a decedent's bounty.9 4 Domestic partnerships constitute a signifi-
cant segment of the American family.95 Therefore, intestacy laws
should be revised to protect domestic partners' justifiable
expectations. 96
Probate codes, including the UPC, have been slow to account for
nontraditional families. The last major revisions to the UPC, made in
1990, tried to accommodate some of the changes in families by insti-
tuting provisions dealing with stepchildren and second marriages. 97
However, there are other variations of the traditional family that re-
main unrecognized.
3. Summary of Policy
Intestacy statutes attempt to ensure the "distribution of real and
personal property that approximates what decedents would have done
if they had made a will."98 The National Conference designed the
UPC to reflect the presumed donative intent of those who die intes-
tate.99 Ideally, individuals thus have the ability to not execute a will
and still be assured that their accumulated wealth will pass to the in-
tended takers.
The UPC and individual state probate codes, however, have not
kept up with the changing times. Consequently, many individuals, es-
pecially those in domestic partnerships, must make a will if they wish
to have their estate pass to their partner. 100
The next Part of this Note discusses legal recognition of domestic
partnerships. While legal rights for domestic partners have increased
93 Id,
94 See ROBERT A. FARMER & Assoc., THE TRUTH ABoUT INHERrrANcE 7-8 (1968).
95 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 3.
96 See RHEINsTEIN & GLENDON, supra note 23, at 25 ("[O]ur present American intes-
tacy laws are of venerable age, [and while they] have reflected the popular traditions of
their time and place.... one may well wonder to what extent they express present Ameri-
can convictions."). One could argue that domestic partnerships do not need intestate pro-
tections because a partner could simply execute a will devising his or her property to a
companion. Domestic partners, however, want and need intestacy protections for the
same reasons married couples do: namely that many individuals "are reluctant to think
about their mortality and procrastinate about remote contingencies. They fail to execute
wills and powers of attorney, even though they are often aware of the unfortunate conse-
quences of failing to act." Chambers, supra note 11, at 457.
97 See generally Waggoner, supra note 2 (discussing the 1990 UPC revisions).
98 King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87-88 (W. Va. 1983).
99 See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IoWA L. Rxv. 611, 640
(1988).
100 See Lovas, supra note 2, at 363 ("Unless... voluntary protections have been created,
the survivor of such an unmarried couple, homosexual or heterosexual, stands completely
without inheritance rights.").
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significantly in many areas of the law over the past decade, 10 1 intestacy
laws do not yet recognize domestic partners. With the growing recog-
nition of nontraditional relationships, probate codes should be re-
vised to ensure protection of domestic partners.
11
TiE RIGHTS OF DomSTIc PARTNERS
The number of claims by cohabitants who wish to protect their
legal interests increases as the number of people living together
outside the confines of marriage continues to rise. 02 Courts are in-
creasingly confronted with cases arising out of nonmarital relation-
ships.10 3 Eschewing a traditional, formalistic approach (i.e., simply
asking whether or not a couple is legally married), courts have started
to examine the characteristics of individual relationships. 10 4 In taking
this approach, courts are attempting "to protect the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties regarding their relationship." 105
A. Opposite-Sex Partners
Courts first recognized the legitimacy of claims of unmarried
couples in suits involving the termination of a committed relation-
ship. 10 6 In examining these types of cases, courts have tried to deter-
mine the mutual rights and obligations of the partners after the
relationship dissolves. 10 7 Courts, however, have exhibited very little
uniformity in examining domestic partners' rights. For example,
some courts have allowed recovery under an implied contract the-
ory.10 8 Others have employed a quantum meruit theory, granting re-
covery based on the true value of the services one party performed
during the relationship. 10 9
101 See id.
102 See id.
1o3 See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303
(Wis. 1987).
104 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 87, at 1169 (noting that "courts in most states
have returned to a more functional approach in which they examine the characteristics of
the particular relationship").
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 See, e.g., Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144, 147 (Or. 1976) (holding that an express
agreement between two unmarried parties to live in a marriage-like relationship is not void
as against public policy); Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 316 (holding that nonmarital cohabitors
could use an unjust enrichment claim to recover after dissolution of the relationship);
Brooks v. Steffes (In re Estate of Steffes), 290 N.W.2d 697, 708-09 (Wis. 1980) (holding an
implied contract for repayment of services existed between a man and woman living to-
gether in an adulterous relationship).
108 See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602, 604 (Alaska 1980); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507,
510 (Or. 1978); Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 316.
109 See, e.g., Williams v. Mason, 556 So. 2d 1045, 1051 (Miss. 1990).
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Marvin v. Marvin"0 was one of the first cases to examine the legal
rights of persons in a domestic partnership. In Marvin, the plaintiff
brought a breach-of-contract action against her former cohabitant,
claiming the couple had entered into an oral agreement to "'combine
their efforts and earnings and... share equally any and all property
accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or com-
bined. ' ""' The court granted recovery, concluding that "the judicial
barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the fulfill-
ment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital
relationship should be removed."11 2 The California Supreme Court
directly addressed the issue of nonmarital, domestic relationships in
its opinion, stating that "[a] lthough we recognize the well-established
public policy to foster and promote the institution of marriage, per-
petuation of judicial rules which result in an inequitable distribution
of property accumulated during a nonmarital relationship is neither a
just nor an effective way of carrying out that policy."" 3
Other courts, however, have refused to enforce similar contracts
between domestic partners, concluding that these contracts rest on
illegal or immoral consideration." 4 Still other jurisdictions have ex-
pressed a willingness to enforce property division agreements only if
an express contract exists." 5 At least one jurisdiction requires any
such contracts to be in writing." 6 Finally, no court has been willing to
enforce a purported contract between domestic partners unless it is
possible to sever sexual relations from the consideration of the
contract. 117
110 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Marvin received a great deal of publicity because the
defendant was the famous movie actor, Lee Marvin. See Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limi-
tations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 163, 174
n.53 (1985).
111 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
112 Id. at 122.
113 IM. at 122 (citations omitted).
114 See, e.g., Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78 (Cal. CL App. 1993) ("The agree-
ment is unenforceable because the parties did not cohabit and therefore no consideration
... existed severable from the sexual relationship."); Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82
(Ga. 1977) (holding that cohabitation is an immoral consideration and thus incapable of
supporting a contract); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App.
1983).
115 See, e.g., Alexander v. Alexander (In re Estate of Alexander), 445 So. 2d 836, 840
(Miss. 1984); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Neb. 1981); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617
P.2d 1322, 1323 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
116 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075-.076 (West 1990).
117 See Waggoner, supra note 84, at 69 ("Because prostitution is illegal, a contract for
prostitution is unenforceable.").
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B. Same-Sex Couples
The judicial system has shown bias against individuals in same-
sex, committed relationships, as compared to those in opposite-sex,
committed relationships.' 1 8 Unlike opposite-sex couples, same-sex
couples are legally prohibited from marrying and thus denied the
many rights afforded to married couples." 9
Like heterosexual, domestic couples, gay and lesbian partners do
not have standing to sue in tort for wrongful death or other similar
actions. 120 In addition, individuals in a same-sex domestic partnership
cannot be the recipients of their partner's veterans' benefits or disa-
bility insurance.' 2 ' Also, the spousal communication evidence privi-
lege does not extend to communications between same-sex
couples.' 22 Finally, homosexual parents often face a presumption
against the granting of custody or visitation rights, 123 as well as against
the granting of decision making guardianship over incapacitated
adults.124
118 See Elaine Herscher, 10 Gay Couples to be Honored for Stability at S.F. Cerenony, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 20, 1998, at A20 (describing how one gay couple, although together for
thirty-three years, are "legal strangers, with no claims to inheritance, pensions or any other
benefits automatically extended to heterosexual couples").
119 See EsKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 66. Eskridge lists a number of areas where a same-
sex couple would benefit from legal recognition of its relationship. Although Eskridge
focuses on same-sex couples, these issues affect all unmarried, committed couples. In-
cluded among these rights are: the right to receive support and alimony in the event of
separation or divorce, preference in being appointed personal representative of an intes-
tate decedent, priority in being appointed guardian of an incapacitated individual, the
right to bring a lawsuit for wrongful death, the right to visit an incarcerated partner while
incarcerated, and the right to survivor benefits on the death of a veteran partner. See id. at
66-67.
The reluctance to recognize same-sex couples may be due to a fear that recognizing
homosexual relationships is a threat to family values. For "traditionalists, same-sex mar-
riage is only one more threat to the values that made America great, which are rooted in
[married] families with two parents, and in a whole battery of cultural institutions-among
them churches and schools-that mutually reinforce each other." SAwM-SEx MARRAGE:
THE MoRAL Ar LEGAL DEBAE 11 (Robert M. Baird & Smart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
120 See Raum v. Restaurant Assoc., Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(holding that same-sex partner was not a spouse authorized to bring wrongful death action
and that wrongful death statute, which did not allow such individuals to bring wrongful
death action, did not discriminate against same-sex partners in spousal-type relationship
because opposite-sex couples were also denied); see also Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,
588-90 (Cal. 1988) (holding that a surviving partner of a same-sex relationship could not
recover damages for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress).
121 See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 6, at 87.
122 SeSeEsKRmGE, supra note 15, at 66; see also, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 970, 980-87 (West
1999) (limiting privilege to married couples).
123 See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (explaining that "while a lesbian
mother is not per se an unfit parent," lesbianism is a consideration to be taken into ac-
count in determining the best interests of the child).
124 See generaly Brown, supra note 10 (detailing the development of law of medical
proxy decision making and its effects on same-sex couples).
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Despite the generally disparate treatment of same-sex couples,
courts are increasingly recognizing same-sex relationships and ex-
tending to them rights usually preserved for the traditional family by
taking a functional approach to the task of defining the concept of
"family."125 Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.12 6 is one of the most impor-
tant cases using this approach to define family.127 In Braschi, the court
held that the surviving gay partner of a deceased tenant was part of
the family of the decedent and thus entitled to protection under New
York City rent and eviction regulations. 128 The court reasoned that
consideration of the "emotional and financial commitment and inter-
dependence" of the people involved achieved a more equitable defini-
tion of "family member."129 Despite this decision, other courts have
not adopted this broader definition of family.'3 0
Outside the judicial process, same-sex couples are increasingly
achieving greater rights and recognition. In the private sector, many
corporations and universities now extend employee benefits to do-
mestic partners. 1 1 Several cities have also recently granted some fam-
ily benefits to the unmarried, committed partner of a public
employee. 132 Unlike the coverage afforded to an employee's spouse,
however, these plans usually require committed, same-sex couples to
prove a minimum duration, emotional commitment, intimacy, or
shared financial responsibilities in order to be eligible for these bene-
125 See generally Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Ap-
proach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1640 (1991) [hereinafter Family
Resemblance] (looking at courts' application of a functional approach and ways to improve
on this system).
126 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
127 See id. 53-54 (expanding the meaning of "family" to reflect modem reality).
128 See id. at 52-53.
129 Id. at 54.
130 See Melton, supra note 5, at 501-02; see also, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d
27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing to expand definition of parent to include "categories of
nonparents... who have had prior relationships with a child's parents" and denying child
visitation rights to the same-sex ex-partner of the child's biological mother).
131 See William V. Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5
B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 1, 24 (1995) (discussing employment benefits for unmarried domestic
partners).
132 Seattle, Madison (Wisconsin), Los Angeles, and San Francisco are just a few of the
cities that have granted benefits of this kind. See Robert H. Knight, How Domestic Partner-
ships and "Gay Marriage" Threaten the Family, in SAME-SEx MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL
DEBATE, supra note 119, at 109. San Francisco has gone even further and passed a law
requiring all companies to provide spousal benefits to unmarried partners, regardless of
their sex, as a precondition of doing business with the city. See David W. Purcell, Current
Trends in Same-Sex Marriages, in ON THE ROAD TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A SUPPORTIVE GUIDE
TO PSYCHOLOGICAL, PoIrrICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 37 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell
eds., 1998).
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fits.' 3 3 Thus, aspects of a relationship that are "assumed with respect
to married couples must be proven by unmarried couples." 13 4
Although over five hundred companies and several states and
municipalities extend some family benefits to the same-sex partner of
an employee, the benefits extended are usually limited.' 3 5 Usually,
only health and insurance coverage benefits are included. 136 In some
instances, the benefits may also extend to bereavement and family
medical leave.137 With respect to other rights, however, gays and lesbi-
ans "continue to be treated as legal strangers."1 38
Claims arising upon death are not as common as claims occur-
ring when the relationship ends during the lives of a couple.'3 9 Be-
cause most unmarried couples realize their situation is unique and
mostly ignored by present laws, domestic couples often provide for
each other in their wills.140 In the few recent cases where a surviving
partner has tried to receive a portion of the decedent partner's estate,
the attempts have been unsuccessful. 141 In In re Estate of Cooper,142 for
example, a surviving partner tried to receive a larger share of his dece-
dent partner's estate than the will granted through the elective share
statute. 143 The court denied the claim, holding that a surviving homo-
sexual partner had not been in a "spousal relationship" with the dece-
dent and, therefore, was not entitled to a right of election against the
decedent's will.T44
133 See Vetter, supra note 131, at 4 (discussing the difficulty in distinguishing between
domestic cohabitants who live the equivalent of a spousal relationship and those who live
more like roommates).
134 Id. at 13.
135 See Purcell, supra note 132, at 35. IBM, Microsoft, Apple, Walt Disney, and the
Democratic National Committee are examples of some of the companies that extend bene-
fits to committed partners. See id. at 36-7.
136 See id. at 35.
137 See id. San Francisco's domestic partnership statute is among the most expansive in
the nation and provides qualifying domestic partners with hospital visitation privileges,
paid bereavement leave, and health plan coverage. See Cynthia Gorney, Making It Official:
The Law & Live-Ins; San Francisco Recognizes the Domestic Partner, WASH. PoSr, July 5, 1989, at
C1.
138 Purcell, supra note 132, at 35.
139 See Waggoner, supra note 84, at 63.
140 See id.
141 See In re Petri, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that the
surviving partner of an eleven-year, homosexual relationship was not a "surviving spouse"
under successions laws and could not inherit through intestate succession); In re Estate of
Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 131-32, 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding surviving homosexual
partner of decedent not entitled to right of election against partner's will because legisla-
ture defined "surviving spouse" as limited to husband or wife).
142 187 A.D.2d 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
143 See id. at 129.
144 Id. at 130.
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C. Summary of Rights
Current statutes largely ignore domestic partners' rights, thus
court-made law almost exclusively governs these rights. 145 As unmar-
ried but committed relationships have become increasingly common,
the amount of court-made law recognizing domestic partners has
1,V-1r, On U...S. WM AL a IJVLUE Zt:4
isfactory answers for unmarried couples.' 47 Court decisions are incon-
sistent and results may vary depending on the jurisdiction. 148 Some
courts believe that issues relating to the rights of domestic partners
are better left to the legislature.' 49 Other courts base their refusal to
recognize these domestic partner relationships on moral grounds. 150
Many commentators argue that individuals in committed rela-
tionships should guarantee their relational and testamentary rights
through contracts, wills, and will substitutes.151 Judicial recognition of
agreements concerning committed partners, however, is as unstable as
judicial recognition of the relationship itself.15 2 Often, when an indi-
vidual provides for a partner in a will, the decedent's family members
contest the will. 153 In these cases, courts have most frequently found
in favor of the biological family, concluding that dispositions of one's
estate to someone other than one's natural bounty are suspect. 54
Thus, "[a]lthough persons in committed relationships can [try to]
protect their respective interests ... through private agreements, the
protections fall short of the predictability and enforceability provided
to persons who are married."1 55
145 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 87, at 1168.
146 See id.
147 See Prince, supra note 110, at 167-68.
148 See id.
149 See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-1211 (111. 1979) (noting that the issue
of substituting private arrangement for marriage is a question best left to the legislative
branch).
150 See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988) ("Unmarried cohabitants re-
ceive no similar solicitous statutory protection, nor should they; such would impede the
state's substantial interest in promoting and protecting marriage.")
151 See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 18; Melton, supra note 5, at 508.
152 See Prince, supra note 110, at 167-68.
153 See id.
154 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 87, at 1168.
155 Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 18.
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III
TBE PUBuc PoLicy VimwpoINT
People choose not to get married for many reasons. 156 Some
choose not to marry because of philosophical beliefs. 157 Others do
not marry for economic reasons. 158 There are still others, namely gay
and lesbian couples, who may want to marry, but lack the legal right to
do so.' 5 9
Opponents of intestacy rights for unmarried couples often ad-
vance moral reasons for their view. First, some people believe that
same-sex relationships are "immoral or pathological or... contribute
to the crumbling of the 'traditional' family,"160 and therefore courts
should not recognize them in any manner. Many of these people also
feel that heterosexual, nonmarital couples should not cohabitate. 16 1
Thus, any attempt to extend to unmarried couples the same rights
that married couples enjoy will face opposition from those who do not
want to recognize such nontraditional relationships.
A. Arguments Based on Probate Code Policies
Those opposing the extension of inheritance rights to unmarried
couples focus on intestacy's policy of encouraging the family.' 62 As
stated earlier, the definition of family thus becomes a key issue.
Although unmarried but committed couples do not fit into traditional
notions163 of family, they can function in a similar manner.
The Supreme Court has already recognized the benefits of a flexi-
ble definition of family.'> Scholars characterize this broader ap-
156 Marriage provides many benefits, but also creates many obligations on the partici-
pants. Some of these obligations include sexual fidelity, spousal support, alimony in the
event of separation or divorce, and the marriage penalty in paying federal and local taxes.
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 70. Eskridge argues that these obligations impose costs
which, for some individuals, outweigh the benefits of marriage. See id. He also argues that
permitting marriage for lesbian and gay couples would impose an extra cost-the publicity
of having the marriage be part of the public record. See itL at 71.
157 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 87, at 1165.
158 See id. at 1166. Couples with two incomes may end up in a higher tax bracket than
they would if filing separately. See id. at 1166 & n.7.
159 See supra Part H.B.
160 Chambers, supra note 11, at 486.
161 SeeJoseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentaty Gifts Resultingfrom Meretricious Relationships:
Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 200, 202 (1989).
162 See Melton, supra note 5, at 507.
163 The traditional family usually "refers to people who are related by blood, marriage,
or adoption." Bowman & Cornish, supra note 87, at 1164 n.1.
164 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) ("Ours is by no means a
tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitu-
tional recognition."). This case supports an expansive view of family and the effort to
define familial relationships in functional terms. Cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
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proach as a functionalist view.' 65 As one commentator explained,
"[i]nstead of focusing on the identities and formal attributes of the
individuals within a relationship, the functional approach inquires
whether a relationship shares the essential characteristics of a tradi-
tionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same human needs."' 66
A functional definition of family is more inclusive and adaptable to
individual situations than the traditional definition. A functional defi-
nition recognizes that many people in emotionally and financially de-
pendent, intimate relationships do not, or cannot, for a variety of
reasons, marry the person they love. Several Supreme Court and
lower court decisions suggest a trend toward this functional definition
of the family.167 This trend supports the position that the probate
code should similarly apply a functional definition of family. Finally,
ever since Professor John H. Langbein's rallying cry of "down with
formalism," reform of the UPC has included a more functional view of
family.1a :
Therefore, even though drafters of intestacy laws may wish to pro-
mote the traditional notion of family, these drafters must recognize
that many groups in today's world do not fall within the formal defini-
tion of family, yet function as such. Because many of these groups act
as families, they should not be denied the benefits that probate codes
extend to traditional families. Arguing that probate codes should
only protect the traditional definition of family advances an outdated
view of family169 and fails to account for the growing acceptance and
proliferation of nontraditional families.'70
Sustaining a narrow view of family runs counter to another main
objective of probate codes-effectuating the decedent's donative in-
tent. 71 If the law refuses to recognize committed, nonmarital rela-
tionships, some decedents will never have their donative intentions
123-32 (1989) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that although most familial relationships
that give rise to protected liberty interests are traditional, marital families, unmarried par-
ents and their children may be included in the definition of family, and suggesting that the
definition may expand even further).
165 See Family Resemblance, supra note 125, at 1640-41; Melton, supra note 5, at 501.
166 Family Resemblance, supra note 125, at 1646.
167 See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-32; Moore, 431 U.S. at 504; Brokenbaugh v. New
Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 433, 437 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Braschi v. Stahl
Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989).
168 Bruce H. Mann, Essay, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U.
PA. L. REv. 1033, 1033 (1994). Langbein was a driving force behind recent probate revi-
sions. See id
169 See RHsmnsrmn & GLENDON, supra note 23, at 24-25 ("[M]ost of our present Ameri-
can intestacy laws are of venerable age or, even when of recent date, are no more than
reenactments of older rules.").
170 See id
171 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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protected.172 As one commentator noted, "[h ] undreds of court opin-
ions repeat the stockphrase 'the donor's intention is the polestar of
construction,'" but the law gives limited deference to a donor's in-
tent.173 By withholding intestacy law protection from nontraditional
families, individuals living outside the confines of marriage are denied
respect for their donative intent.174 Present intestacy statutes ignore
the "considerable concern to regulate the devolution of property con-
sistently with the [decedent's] natural but unexpressed desires."1 75
Extending intestacy laws to cover domestic partnerships advances
yet another policy behind intestacy laws-protecting the financially
dependent family.176 Under current law, the earnings of an unmar-
ried person and the resources bought with those earnings are entirely
the property of the earner, regardless of any domestic partnership in
which such person might be engaged. 177 This rule, however, fails to
recognize the reality of many domestic partnerships. Frequently, indi-
viduals in committed relationships pool their income and share ex-
penses and rent, or even jointly buy property, even if title is only in
one of the partners' names.178 Expanding the definition of family to
include committed, domestic partners would recognize that many un-
married, committed couples involved in marriage-like relationships
share financial burdens with each other. The most equitable ap-
proach is to ensure that a surviving partner receives a portion of the
estate to which he or she has contributed.
As is the case in many marriages, in many domestic partnerships
one partner is the primary or sole breadwinner. 179 Thus, the other
partner relies upon the first partner's income.' s0 Because the law lim-
its a surviving partner's ability to inherit to situations in which a valid
and enforceable will exists, an individual whose partner dies intestate
may be left without any means of financial support. Current probate
law treats surviving members of unmarried couples "as having contrib-
uted nothing to the decedent's wealth." 18' Current law ignores not
172 Cf Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 8 (arguing that intestacy statutes not only reflect
social norms and values, but also shape them by recognizing and legitimizing
relationships).
173 Waggoner, supra note 84, at 23.
174 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 23 ("A proposal for including a committed part-
ner as an heir can be defended politically as facilitating individual donative freedom and as
being remedial in nature.").
175 RHAENSrEIN & GLENDON, supra note 23, at 24.
176 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
177 See Waggoner, supra note 84, at 62.
178 See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 406-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
179 See Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared
Moral Life 75 GEo. LJ. 1829, 1841 (1987); Waggoner, supra note 84, at 67.
180 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 57.
181 Waggoner, supra note 84, at 63.
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only financial contributions, but a surviving partner's time, support
and sacrifices as well.182
As previously noted, the last objective of intestacy law is ensuring
a fair pattern of distribution. 183 Granting intestacy rights to surviving
partners will not disrupt this goal. Arguably, courts and legislators
should define the concept of "fair distribution" with reference to reli-
ance interests.184 In committed, domestic partnerships, like in mar-
riages, the surviving partner is the party most likely to rely on
receiving a portion of the decedent's estate.
B. Arguments Based on Public Attitudes and Actions
Pursuit of the policies behind intestacy statutes compels the ex-
tension of inheritance rights to surviving, committed partners. Fur-
thering these objectives, however, is not the only reason that
inheritance rights should be offered to those in domestic partner-
ships. Intestacy laws are a reflection of public attitudes. 85 The Uni-
form Probate Code and state probate codes have tried to draft their
provisions based on public beliefs and actions. 186 In determining who
should inherit and how much they should inherit, the UPC looks to
valid, previous wills as a guide.' 8 7
Most partners in committed relationships leave the majority of
their estate to their surviving partner.188 Another indication that most
domestic partners wish to have their surviving partner inherit at least
part of their estate is that many individuals name their partner as the
beneficiary of an insurance policy.189 A 1996 phone survey conducted
by the Minnesota Center for Survey Research also supports this
view.190 The survey assessed public attitudes concerning the intestacy
rights of surviving partners. 191 The survey found that a majority of the
public wanted a surviving partner to be able to inherit from an intes-
182 See id.
183 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
184 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 12.
185 See id. at 11.
186 See id.
187 See id. at 11-12.
188 See Margolick, supra note 91, at Cl.
189 See id.
190 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 31-51. The survey was conducted to determine
"attitudes about the inheritance rights for couples who are living together without being
married." Id. at 31. The survey found that a "substantial majority" of those interviewed
thought a partner should receive at least some of a decedent partner's estate. Id. at 38.
The survey presented several scenarios to the interviewees. In some, the decedent partner
was survived by both their partner and descendants; in others, the decedent partner was
survived by their partner and by their parents; and in still others, the decedent was survived
by just their partner. In all of the scenarios the respondents said the surviving partner
should inherit at least half of the estate. See id.
191 See id. at 31.
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tate partner.192 The results of this survey demonstrate society's chang-
ing definition of family. Thus, allowing surviving partners to inherit
intestate would not only reflect the probable donative intent of indi-
viduals in domestic partnership relationships, but also coincide with
public opinion.
While many married couples do not draft wills, they still know
that their spouses will be protected by the law. Extending inheritance
rights would give committed couples the same security as married
couples. Domestic partners would thus have the option of either mak-
ing a will or dying intestate, in either case being "assure [d] that accu-
mulated wealth [would] pass[ I to their intended takers."'9 3 This
approach would also end the courts' need to develop legal fictions to
fulfill the equitable demands of domestic partnership relations.' 94
Through these legal maneuvers, courts have attributed the responsi-
bilities and benefits of marriage to nonmarital relationships. 95 If leg-
islatures extended intestacy laws to cover domestic partnerships,
courts could then justifiably consider a surviving partner to be the nat-
ural object of a decedent's bounty without the added confusion and
complexity of judicial fictions.
The "denial of legal rights to [unmarried but committed] couples
is a wrong committed by society."196 Denying unmarried, committed
couples rights under intestacy laws imposes a great financial burden
on these couples that married couples do not incur.' 97 Documents
such as wills and contracts are expensive, 98 difficult to prepare, 99
and do not "create the same level of protection, no matter how thor-
oughly prepared."200 Because intestacy laws do not recognize unmar-
192 See id. at 38.
193 Id. at 12.
194 See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
195 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 87, at 1168.
196 Melton, supra note 5, at 499.
197 See THE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SAME-SEx RELA-
TIONSHIPS REPORT, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11-4 (1998) [hereinafter COLORADO RE-
PORT]. Committed couples "don't have automatic access to [certain] benefits." Id. As one
homosexual man testified at a Denver Public Hearing: "We have to research. We have to
pay lawyers. We have to pay clerks. We have to cobble together an inefficient and some-
times inadequate legal structure to mimic the comprehensive and polished system that's
available to married people." Id. (statement of RobertJanowski, M.D.).
198 A 1995 Hawaii Commission found that it cost at least $6800 to make a will or en-
forceable contract dividing resources. This number is probably a low estimate for complex
financial relationships. See CoMM'N ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND LAw, STATE OF HAWAII
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND Tm LAW 1(111) (1995) [hereinaf-
ter HAwAI REPoRT].
199 See COLORADO REPORT, supra note 197, at 11-4 (statement of RobertJanowski, M.D.).
200 Id. at 11-5. As one participant, M.J. Lowe, stated at the hearings:
[R]epresentatives say there are legal documents... [committed couples]
can get to make up for the lack of [a legal] relationship .... [But]
[s] electing and drafting the correct version of documents requires the serv-
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ried couples, these couples cannot count on enforcement of contracts
they make because the provisions of intestacy statutes often affect the
interpretation of wills and trusts. 20 1 Thus, unequivocally granting in-
testacy rights to unmarried, committed couples should also reduce
the number of will contests.
Most of those who oppose extending rights to domestic partners,
base their arguments on religious conviction.20 2 Some opponents be-
lieve that "there is no benefit to the state from a homosexual union"
and that the state must protect the tradition of marriage between two
individuals of the opposite sex.2°3 These arguments are based on fear
that extending rights to unmarried couples will undermine the institu-
tion of marriage and "contribute to the moral decay of society."20 4
Therefore, according to this view, the state should not give committed
couples the same rights as married couples.
In drafting legislation, however, a state must separate religion
and government. 20 5 In addition, extending intestacy rights does not
interfere with religious rights, the institution of marriage, or affirm
"the morality [and] the rightness of homosexual relationships."20 6 It
merely allows a distinct but significant section of society to have its
donative intent fulfilled without incurring outrageous costs.
Because same-sex partners do not even have the option of mar-
riage, it is unfair to punish these couples by denying them statutory
recognition of their donative intent. Same-sex domestic partners
should not be punished merely because the legal system has not kept
up with their growing numbers and increased acceptance by society.
In addition, many same-sex partners are estranged from their families
because of their lifestyle. This is "doubly unfortunate" for these
couples since, in the absence of a will, those most likely to inherit are
estranged parents or siblings.207
Simply because a couple finds marriage inappropriate or unavail-
able, the law should not limit or deny protection, recognition, or vali-
dation of their relationship. This statement is especially true in the
realm of inheritance rights. Extending intestacy laws will not neces-
ices of an attorney, can cost quite a bit of money, and [there is] no guaran-
tee that they will be honored in a time of crisis.
Id. at 11-4 (statement of M.J. Lowe).
201 See Lomenzo, supra note 18, at 947.
202 See CoLoRADo REPORT, supra note 197, at 11-8.
203 Id. at 11-9.
204 Id. at 11-10.
205 See id. at 11-13 (concluding that with respect to same-sex marriages, "the policy of
separation of church and state should be followed strictly").
206 Id. at H1-8.
207 Chambers, supra note 11, at 457-58.
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sarily affect other rights of unmarried couples, 208 but will instead sim-
ply respect a decedent's wishes, thereby further satisfying the main
objectives of intestacy laws. Providing committed couples with intes-
tacy rights would not only satisfy a decedent partner's probable dona-
tive intent, but also reflect the general public's view as well.
C. Argument Based on the Ability to Define Committed
Partners
Another major argument against extending intestacy rights to
committed partners is that it is exceedingly difficult to define who
qualifies as a committed partner.20 9 This argument, however, lacks
merit. Many companies and cities already define these relationships
for the purpose of employee benefits, insurance, and other similar
programs.2 10
The main difficulty in defining domestic partnerships is limiting
both overinclusion and underinclusion. For example, it is necessary
to distinguish roommates from those in committed relationships. An-
other important factor to consider is the duration of the relationship;
an individual might live with another for a period of time, but not
necessarily want that person to inherit his or her estate.21' Difficulty
arises in determining how long is long enough in defining a commit-
ted relationship.
There are several alternatives to a case-by-case judicial determina-
tion of who is in a committed relationship. 212 For example, legisla-
tures could institute a registration system requiring committed
couples to fulfill certain procedural steps and meet specific eligibility
requirements in order to obtain rights given to committed couples.
This self-identification process would eliminate any threat of overin-
clusion. An alternative approach would be to establish by statute spe-
cific factors for courts to examine in evaluating whether a couple is
sufficiently committed. This Note will analyze these approaches in the
next Part.
208 For example, granting unmarried couples an intestacy right does not mean that the
ability to get married, sue for loss of consortium, or exercise immunity under evidence laws
will automatically follow. Each law has different policies and can be amended on an indi-
vidual basis.
209 See Melton, supra note 5, at 576.
210 See COLORADO REPORT, supra note 197, at 11-3.
211 See Family Resemblance, supra note 125, at 1646.
212 Cf WAGGoNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 104 (discussing the State of New York's fac-
tors for defining "family" under its eviction protection laws).
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D. Summary
Individuals in domestic partnerships can try to protect their inter-
ests through private agreements, wills, and will substitutes.2 1 3 Private
ordering, however, cannot provide the same protection married
couples enjoy.2 1 4 Case law concerning the rights of domestic partners
is so varied that, as one commentator noted, "one might expect that
public policy has proven itself to romp in an unbridled manner, with
judges in different places and at different times reaching very differ-
ent conclusions about morals and the public good and refusing to
enforce contracts on that basis."2 15
Presently, committed couples need to pay for an attorney to draft
a will or agreement to protect their partner's inheritance rights. Even
then, domestic partners have no guarantee that a court will uphold
these expensive agreements. 2 16 Thus, the present system harms
nonmarital couples in a number of ways: First, many domestic part-
ners may not be able to afford the expensive procedures required to
guarantee their rights; second, even if domestic partners can afford to
hire an attorney, there is no guarantee their wishes will be recognized.
Finally, contracts are only useful once conflict arises.
Recognizing domestic partnerships in intestacy law not only elim-
inates the costs imposed on committed couples, but also guarantees a
measure of respect for donative intent. In addition, the proposed ap-
proach ensures that sufficiently committed though unmarried couples
benefit from the same laws that benefit married couples.
IV
ATrEMTS AT FuLFnIUNG INTESTATE POLICEES
A. Existing Law
Most current probate codes are designed to protect the tradi-
tional family,2 1 7 and thus informal relationships are rarely recognized.
Unmarried, heterosexual couples were historically protected through
common-law marriage provisions.2 1 8 However, most states have now
abolished common-law marriages2 1 9 because these informal associa-
213 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 18; Prince, supra note 110, at 167.
214 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 18 (noting that private agreements "fall short of
the predictability and enforceability provided to persons who are married").
215 Prince, supra note 110, at 169.
216 See id. at 164-66.
217 See Lovas, supra note 2, at 35,-54.
218 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 87, at 1169.
219 Only eleven states and the District of Columbia still recognize common-law mar-
riage. These states are Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. SeeWAGcoNER Er AL., supra note
6, at 84. New Hampshire has a statutory version of common-law marriage that is applicable
only on death. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992).
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tions were vulnerable to fraud. 220 In states where common-law mar-
riage still exists, sufficiently committed, heterosexual couples receive
the same intestacy protection as married couples.22' Common-law
marriage states, however, rarely extend rights to same-sex couples, 22 2
thereby ignoring a large number of domestic partnerships.
As society's standards have evolved over the past several decades,
nonmarital relationships that parallel marriage relationships have
greatly increased. As the number of such relationships has grown,
courts have increasingly begun to appreciate the need for some kind
of legal recognition of such relationships. Various courts have taken a
variety of approaches in dealing with domestic partnerships. For ex-
ample, one court has employed a quantum meruit theory in granting
a surviving domestic partner a share of a decedent's estate.2 23 An-
other court has, with respect to same-sex couples, expanded the defi-
nition of family to include a surviving partner within the protection of
state rent-control and eviction laws.2 24 One state supreme court
found that a prohibition on same-sex marriages violated the state con-
stitution.2 2  Still other courts, although not directly extending addi-
tional rights to same-sex domestic partners, have expressed serious
doubts about whether marriage should be limited to opposite-sex
couples.22 6 As one commentator opined, this view can be interpreted
as a call to state legislatures to amend state statutes to ensure sufficient
marital and inheritance rights for committed, same-sex couples.227
These various acts and views of the judiciary should be collectively in-
terpreted as attempting to extend domestic partners more and more
rights within our legal system. State legislatures should take note of
this judicial activity and seek to amend current intestacy laws to better
reflect the dynamics of today's society.
220 See Kandoian, supra note 179, at 1851.
221 See id. at 1830-31.
222 See, e.g., De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 953-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding
that same-sex individuals cannot create a common-law marriage contractually); Slayton v.
State, 633 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that it is impossible for a same-sex
couple to marry "with or without the formalities of law").
223 See Williams v. Mason, 556 So. 2d 1045, 1048-51 (Miss. 1990) (concluding that
although the surviving partner could not enforce oral contract with decedent because of
the statute of frauds, the partner was entitled to receive the reasonable value of services
rendered to the decedent).
224 See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (concluding that
"a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of the family includes two adult lifetime
partners whose relationship is long term").
225 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993).
226 See In re Petri, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (noting that "[i]t is
questionable whether, in this era of domestic partnerships and alternative lifestyle educa-
tion in grammar schools, it can still be said that marriage has one universal meaning which
does not include couples of the same sex").
227 See Daniel Wise, Inheritance Barred to Gay Without a Wil'Judge: Partner's Rights Tied to
Marriage License, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 4, 1995, at 1.
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Although there is some agreement that nonmarital relationships
should receive greater recognition, especially in the realm of intestacy
statutes,228 there is no single solution to the problems facing nontradi-
tional families. One of the major obstacles legislatures face in ex-
tending intestacy rights to domestic partners is deciding exactly how
to define these relationships. In addition, because nontraditional
families exist in so many variations, no statutory provision will be per-
fect. Nevertheless, legislatures should attempt to address these issues.
There have already been a number of attempts, both at the local level
and nationally (by a proposed amendment to the UPC), to extend
intestacy rights to domestic partners. 229 The remainder of this Note
examines possible ways to extend intestacy rights to benefit commit-
ted partners.
B. Attempts at Statutory Revision
One way to extend inheritance rights to committed couples is to
revise current statutes. For example, probate codes could simply be
amended to statutorily include committed partners in existing inheri-
tance laws. Another approach would be to draft entirely new laws ap-
plicable only to unmarried couples. This second approach would
allow drafters to give committed couples and married couples differ-
ent rights concerning the portion of the estate one can inherit from
an intestate partner or spouse. In addition, drafters would have dis-
cretion to decide whether other rights, such as elective shares, should
be extended to committed couples.
Probate code provisions are influenced by tradition and his-
tory.23 0 Drafters, however, should try "not to perpetuate historical
rules that [are] ... inconsistent with modem attitudes."23 1 Because
probate codes are intended to reflect current societal sentiment and a
decedent's probable donative intent,23 2 probate codes should be
amended to reflect today's society and give committed couples inheri-
tance rights. 233
Statutory revisions with respect to committed couples would not
have to affect existing marriage laws. 234 They could be sufficiently
narrowly drafted to only grant a surviving partner the right to inherit
228 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 5-6.
229 See infra Part IV.B, C.
230 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 11.
231 Id.
232 See supra Part I.B.
233 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 11.
234 Drafters could write a separate statute which applied only to committed partners'
right to inherit from their intestate partners. This kind of statute would not implicate
eligibility and marriage formalities. See, e.g., WAGGONER Er AL., supra note 6, at 107 (setting
out Waggoner's proposal).
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from an intestate partner. This tactic would minimize criticism from
those who want to protect traditional notions of family.
There has already been some attempts to amend current probate
codes to include domestic partners. Professor Waggoner proposed to
the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code a statute al-
lowing unmarried individuals to inherit from a deceased partner.23 5
This proposal has generated much discussion and influenced states
235 Waggoner's proposed amendment, entitled "Intestate Share of Committed Part-
ner," reads:
(a) [Amount.] If an unmarried, adult decedent dies without a valid will and
leaves a surviving committed partner, the decedent's surviving committed
partner is entitled to:
(1) the first [$50,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate
estate if-
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the dece-
dent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descend-
ants of the surviving committed partner and there is no other de-
scendant of the surviving committed partner who survives the
decedent;
(2) one-half of the intestate estate, in cases not covered by paragraph
(1).
(b) [Committed Partner, Requirements.] To be the decedent's committed part-
ner, the individual must, at the decedent's death: (i) have been an unmar-
ried adult; (ii) not have been prohibited from marrying the decedent
under the law of this state by reason of a blood relationship of the dece-
dent; and (iii) have been sharing a common household with the decedent
in a marriage-like relationship. Only one individual can qualify as the dece-
dent's committed partner for purposes of this section.
(c) [Common Household] For purposes of subsections (b) and (e), "sharing
a common household" . . . means that the decedent and the individual
shared the same place to live, whether or not one or both had other places
to live and whether or not one or both were physically residing somewhere
else at the decedent's death ....
(d) [Marriage-like Relationship; Factors.] For purposes of subsection (b), a
"marriage like relationship" is a relationship that corresponds to the rela-
tionship between marital partners, in which two individuals have chosen to
share one another's lives in a long-term, intimate, and committed relation-
ship of mutual caring. Although no single factor or set of factors deter-
mines whether a relationship qualifies as marriage-like, the following
factors are among those to be considered:
(1) the purpose, duration, constancy, and degree of exclusivity of the
relationship;
(2) the degree to which the parties intermingled finances ....
(3) the degree to which the parties formalized legal obligations, inten-
tions and responsibilities to one another, such as by one or both nam-
ing the other as primary beneficiary of life insurance or employee
benefit plans or as agent to make health care decisions;
(4) whether the couple shared in co-parenting a child and the degree
ofjoint care and support given the child;
(5) whether the couple joined in a marriage or a commitment cere-
mony, even if the ceremony was not of a type giving rise to a presump-
tion under subsection (e) (3); and
(6) the degree to which the couple held themselves out to others as
married or the degree to which the couple held themselves out to
others as emotionally and financially committed to one another on a
permanent basis.
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and cities to consider extending intestacy rights to committed
couples.2 36 Although the Joint Editorial Board recently dropped the
proposal,237 Waggoner's proposal has opened the debate on ex-
tending intestacy rights and remains an excellent model for statutory
revision.
Waggoner's proposal accomplishes two things: it determines both
who is a surviving committed partner and what the intestacy share of
those individuals should be.23 8 Waggoner suggests giving a surviving,
committed partner a smaller share than what is given to a surviving
spouse.2 39 Thus, Waggoner's proposal avoids looking like a common-
law marriage intestacy statute.2 40 Waggoner recommends a smaller in-
testate portion for surviving, committed partners "in recognition of
the competing claims of the decedent's blood or adoptive relatives,
and to some extent to maintain the incentive to enter into formal
marriage." 241
Waggoner's proposal sets forth four criteria for identifying com-
mitted partners.242 First, the partners cannot be related by blood.243
Second, neither partner can be married at the decedent's death.244
(e) [Presumption.] An individual's relationship with the decedent is pre-
sumed to have been marriage-like if:
(1) during the [six] year period next preceding the decedent's death
the decedent and the individual shared a common household for peri-
ods totaling at least [five] years;
(2) the decedent or the individual registered or designated the other
as his [or her] domestic partner with and under procedures estab-
lished by an organization and neither partner executed a document
terminating or purporting to terminate the registration designation;
(3) the decedent and the individual joined in a marriage or commit-
ment ceremony conducted and contemporaneously certified in writing
by an organization; or
(4) the individual is the parent of a child of the decedent, or is or was
a party to a written co-parenting agreement with the decedent regard-
ing a child, and if, in either case, the child lived before the age of 18 in
the common household of the decedent and the individual.
(f) [Force of the Presumption.] If a presumption arises under subsection (e)
because only one of the factors is established, the presumption is rebuttable
by a preponderance of the evidence. If more than one of the listed factors
is established, the presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
Id.
236 See E-mail from Lawrence Waggoner, Professor of Law, University of Michigan, to
Marissa Holob, Comel Law Review (Jan. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
237 See E-mail from Lawrence Waggoner, Professor of Law, University of Michigan, to
Marissa Holob, Corme Law Review (Jan. 25, 1999) (on fie with author). The proposal was
dropped so that states could adopt individual solutions. See id
238 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 24.
239 See id. at 25.
240 See id.
241 Id.
242 See WAGGONER ET Al ., supra note 6, at 107, § (b)-(d).
243 See id. § (b).
244 See id.
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Third, the partners must have "shared the same place to live, whether
or not [they] had other places to live."2 45 Lastly, the two individuals
must have had a "marriage-like" relationship.2 46 If these four criteria
are met, a surviving partner will receive an intestate portion regardless
of whether the couple ever signed any forms solemnizing their rela-
tionship. Thus, a surviving partner's inheritance rights will not be ter-
minated merely because of a technicality.
The first three of Waggoner's criteria are objective. The fourth
requirement, however, is subjective and will be effective in identifying
truly committed couples. The proposal defines marriage-like relation-
ship as two individuals who "share one another's lives in a long-term,
intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring."2 47 In deter-
mining whether a relationship is marriage-like, Waggoner proposes
several considerations, including the following: the length of the rela-
tionship, whether the two individuals share finances,2 48 and whether
they participated in a commitment ceremony.2 49
Waggoner's proposal, although effective, fails to address certain
significant issues. Foremost, unmarried couples remain unable to
fully benefit from the laws that married couples do.2 50 If a surviving
partner is satisfactorily identified as the natural object of a decedent's
bounty, the surviving partner should take the same portion of the es-
tate that a surviving spouse receives. The policies underlying probate
codes would be best satisfied by allowing the decedent's full donative
intent to be recognized.
By recognizing marriage-like relationships between same-sex indi-
viduals, Waggoner's proposal raises serious potential issues.25' Those
who resist expanding the definition of marriage may vehemently ob-
ject to Waggoner's proposal, but may perhaps be more receptive to a
registration system. Another potential problem is that because the cri-
teria for determining a marriage-like relationship are subjective, litiga-
tion could ensue.252 Finally, because there is no guarantee courts will
use these criteria in the manner Waggoner envisions, nonmarital
couples would still not have the same security as married couples.
Waggoner's proposal is, however, a significant step in the right
direction. It substantiates the status of nonmarital relationships in
modem society and thereby confers significant rights on domestic
245 Id. § (c).
246 Id. § (d).
247 Id.
248 See id. § (d)(1).
249 See id. § (d) (5).
250 See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 26.
251 See id. at 27.
252 See Waggoner, supra note 84, at 83 (discussing the potential for litigation, but ex-
plaining how the proposal addresses this issue).
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partners. Waggoner's proposal, at least one commentator has argued,
"presents the best chance that a deserving individual will obtain heir
status and that an undeserving individual will not."
253
C. Another Approach: Reciprocal Benefits
Another way to extend inheritance rights to same-sex couples is
through a "reciprocal benefits" method. The debate over reciprocal
benefits began in the early 1990s when Hawaii came close to ex-
tending the right to marry to lesbian and gay couples.2 54 Permitting
same-sex marriages would guarantee individuals in same-sex relation-
ships the protections provided by the institution of marriage.255 Al-
lowing same-sex marriages, however, would still not address the rights
of those who decide not to marry.
Many states reacted negatively to Hawaii's proposal of permitting
same-sex marriage.2 56 In response, Hawaii established a commission
to examine the major legal and economic benefits of extending the
right of marriage to same-sex couples.2 57 After many months of de-
bate, the commission recommended extending "all the benefits [mar-
ried couples have] to same-gender couples by allowing them to
marry. 258 As a result of the commission's report, but despite its spe-
cific recommendation, Hawaii's legislature passed the Reciprocal Ben-
efits Act, a comprehensive domestic partnership rights law.2 59
Although domestic partnership laws fall short of granting full
marital status, they do extend the rights and obligations of marriage
to domestic partners without requiring marriage.2 60 To receive these
253 Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 28-29.
254 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (concluding that a state requirement
that marriage be between a male and female "was subject to strict 'scrutiny'"); Baehr v.
Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996), affd 950 P.2d 1234
(Haw. 1997); Ellen Goodman, The Marrying Kind, TI.mis-PIcAvuNE, Jan. 5, 1999.
255 See HAWAII REPORT, supra note 198, at Summary.
256 See Goodman, supra note 254.
257 See HAWAI REPORT, supra note 198.
258 Id. at ch. III, § IV.
259 See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 572C-1 to -7 (Michie 1999). New York City and
Minneapolis also have registration for unmarried couples by local ordinances. NEW YORK
Crry, N.Y., CODE tit. 51, § 4-01 (2000); MINNE.AoUs, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch.
142, § 142.30 (2000). In October 1999, when this Note was already being prepared for
publication, California enacted a registration system for domestic partnerships. See Family
Law-Domestic Partners-Rights and Obligations, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 588 (West)
(codified in scattered sections of CAL. FAm. CODE, CAL. GOV'T CODE, and CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE (West 2000)). While the California provision is beyond the scope of this
Note, the reader should note that this provision preempts local registration ordinances, see
id. § 2 (codified at CAL. FAm. CODE § 299.6 (West 2000)), and provides for termination
proceedings, see id. § 2 (codified at CAL. F~m. CODE § 299 (West 2000)), but does not ex-
pressly alter intestacy rights.
260 Some of the rights extended to domestic partners under domestic partnership laws
include: (1) a share of a decedent's estate equivalent to that of a surviving spouse, (2) a
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benefits, a couple must declare its status as a domestic partnership.261
In Hawaii, once domestic partners have filed their declarations, they
are included in any definition or statutory use of the terms spouse,
family, immediate family, or dependent.262 In addition, the Family
Court will exercise jurisdiction over domestic partnership dissolution
cases in the same way it will over divorce cases. 263
Hawaii's domestic partnership law only applies to parties "legally
prohibited from marrying under Hawaii law,"264 and thus opposite-sex
couples cannot benefit from the law. The requirements of Hawaii's
domestic partnership law, however, are sufficiently broad so as to al-
low related individuals to qualify.2 65 This, unfortunately, "undermines
the recognition of same-sex committed relationships as uniquely inti-
mate, emotional attachments and therefore supports rather than dis-
rupts subordination based on sexual orientation."266
Hawaii's domestic partnership law is limited in that it does not
extend rights unless a couple signs the declaration.267 If a couple
does not properly declare its relationship, they receive none of the
rights extended by the law, including those relating to inheritance
rights. Even if "there is substantial and convincing evidence that a
committed relationship existed between the decedent and another
person," a surviving partner has no intestacy rights if the relationship
was not properly declared.268 As one commentator has noted, Ha-
waii's enactment of its Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act may mean that
courts will be "less willing to recognize contractual and equitable
claims of one same-sex partner against the other."269
D. Colorado's Attempt: Registration of Committed Partners
Other states have explored alternative ways of extending to do-
mestic partners rights similar to those afforded married couples. For
example, in September 1997, Colorado Governor Roy Romer ap-
pointed a commission "to explore whether or not the state should
extend any rights, benefits, responsibilities, or obligations to commit-
homestead allowance, (3) exempt property protection, and (4) an elective share option.
See HAw. Ray. STAT. A-N. tit. 31, §§ 560:2-102, :2-402 to :2-404.
261 The statute defines a "declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship" as "a state-
ment in a form issued by the director [of health] that declares the intent of two people to
enter into a relationship. By signing it, two people swear under penalty of perjury that they
meet the requirements for a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship." Id. §§ 572C-4 to -5.
262 See id. § 572G-1.
263 See id. § 560:2-804.
264 Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 29.
265 See id. at 30 (H.Aw. Rrv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 572C-2).
266 Id.
267 See id. at 29.
268 Id.
269 Me at 29 n.146.
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ted relationships between two members of the same sex."270 This ac-
tion followed the Governor's veto of bills attempting to amend the
State's definition of marriage to ban same-sex marriages altogether.271
Among the topics the commission focused on were property and
inheritance rights. After several hearings and much study, the com-
mission recommended extending same-sex couples rights and respon-
sibilities coextensive with married couples.2 72  In reaching this
conclusion, the commission rejected "the assertion that persons in
committed relationships are able to access the necessary rights and
protections through existing legal means, such as wills and powers of
attorney."275
Wishing to avoid piecemeal legislation,274 the commission recom-
mended a comprehensive solution. The commission recommended
that the state "create a legal framework to recognize the establishment
and registration of committed relationships."275 The commission also
recommended "that a single law be adopted ... [making] reference
to those laws extending rights, protections, obligations, and responsi-
bilities to married couples and amend[ing] such laws by reference to
apply also to registered committed partners."276
Colorado's progress on the commission's recommendations has
been limited. Governor Romer was denied reelection in 1998 and for
the first time in over twenty years, Colorado has a Republican gover-
nor and Republican-controlled Senate.27 7 Because of this political
changeover, Colorado has not implemented the commission's recom-
mendations.278 The Colorado legislature has acted on some aspects
of the commission's report, including introducing a bill defining com-
mitted relationships. 279 In addition, the legislature has identified pro-
270 COLORADO REPORT, supra note 197, at I-1.
271 See id. The Governor twice vetoed such bills passed by the state legislature, once in
1996 and again in 1997. See id.
272 See id. at IH-19.
273 Id. at 11-17 (noting further that the "overwhelming evidence [indicated that] such
arrangements cannot create the same level of protection for committed partners that is
available to married couples").
274 See id. at IV-3.
275 Id. at IV-2. The proposal defined committed relationship as one "between two peo-
ple of the same-sex who affirm that they are not related by kinship, are of the legal age of
consent and are not otherwise married or registered in another committed relationship."
Id. at lV-3.
276 Id.
277 See Michelle Dally Johnston, Owen Sees Exdting Times' 40th Governor, First in GOP
since 1975, DENVER PosT, Jan. 13, 1999, at Al.
278 SeeJohn Sanko, Changes in the Offing Under Owens, Conservative Bent Sure to Provide
Contrast to 24 Year Democratic Run, Rocm, MOUNTAIN Posr, Jan. 3, 1999, at 5A.
279 See A Bill for an Act Concerning Probate Procedures for Reciprocal Beneficiaries,
S.B. 111, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000) (proposing amendments to Colorado Revised
Statutes that would "authorize Reciprocal Beneficiaries to stand in the same position and
inherit from their deceased partners in the same manner as a surviving spouse would in-
1524 [Vol. 85:1492
RESPECTING COMMITMENT
bate and inheritance law as the first area of law it wants to amend with
respect to domestic partners.2 80
The Colorado commission's approach is very similar to Hawaii's
reciprocal benefits method. Hawaii's plan, however, allows registered
domestic partners to receive all of the benefits of married couples. As
a result of Hawaii's domestic partnership law, any reference to spouse
herit from his or her deceased spouse"). The proposed bill defines a "RECIPROCAL BEN-
EFICIARY" as a person who is a "COMMITTED PARTNER." Id. (proposing the addition of
section 15-10-201 to Colorado Revised Statutes). A "COMMITTED PARTNER" is a party to a
"COMMITTED PARTNERSHIP," which means "A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN TWO PER-
SONS WHO HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES AS COMMITTED PARTNERS, WHO
HAVE FILED AN AFFIDAVIT OF COMMITTED PARTNERSHIP PURSUANT TO SEC-
TION 13-23-103, AND [who meet certain criteria]." Id. (proposing the addition of section
13-23-102(1)-(2) to the Colorado Revised Statutes). Several criteria are then listed. First, both
persons must be over eighteen years of age and neither may be married or a partner in
another committed relationship. See id. (proposing the addition of section 13-23-
102(2) (a)-(b) to the Colorado Revised Statutes). Second, the committed partners must not
be permitted to marry each other under Colorado law. See id. (proposing the addition of
section 13-23-102(2) (c) to the Colorado Revised Statutes). Third, the two persons cannot be
related by blood in a way that would prevent them from marrying under Colorado law. See
id. (proposing the addition of section 13-23-101(2)(d) to the Colorado Revised Statutes).
Fourth, neither partner may have terminated the committed relationship pursuant to the
proposed section 13-23-103. See id. (proposing the addition of section 13-23-102(2) (e) to
the Colorado Revised Statutes). Finally, the bill provides that a "COMMITTED PARTNER-
SHIP" is established when the partners execute and file an "AFFIDAVIT OF COMMITTED
PARTNERSHIP" with the county clerk and recorder attesting to the foregoing require-
ments. Id. (proposing the addition of section 13-23-103 to the Colorado Revised Statutes).
280 See id. The proposed bill would extend intestate succession to a "SURVIVING RE-
CIPROCAL BENEFICIARY." Id. (proposing the amendment of section 15-11-102 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes); see also id. (proposing the amendment of section 15-10-201 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes (defining "RECIPROCAL BENEFICIARY" as a "COMMITTED
PARTNER" meeting the proposed criteria of section 13-23-102)). The bill would revise
section 15-11-102 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, renaming the section "Share of spouse or
reciprocal beneficiary." See id. The bill proposes that the new section read:
The various possible circumstances describing the decedent, his or her sur-
viving spouse, and HIS OR HER SURVIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICI-
ARY, and their surviving descendants, if any, are set forth in this section to
be utilized in determining the intestate share of the decedent's surviving
spouse OR SURVIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICIARY. If more than one
circumstance is applicable, the circumstances that produce the largest
share for the surviving spouse OR SURVIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICI-
ARY shall be applied.
(1) If:
(a) No descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent,
then the surviving spouse OR SURVIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICI-
ARY receives the entire intestate estate; or
(b) All of the descendant's surviving descendants are also descendants
of the surviving spouse OR SURVIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICIARY
and there are no other descendants of the surviving spouse OR SUR-
VIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICIARY who survive the decedent, then
the surviving spouse OR SURVIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICIARY re-
ceives the entire intestate estate.
Id. (proposing the amendment of section 15-11-102(1) (a)-(b) of the Colorado Revised Stat-
utes). The proposed bill continues, inserting "SURVIVING RECIPROCAL BENEFICIARY"
wherever there is mention of a surviving spouse. Id.
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or surviving spouse includes domestic partners.281 The Colorado pro-
posal is not as broad; even after a couple registers with the state they
are not guaranteed the same fights as married couples. Unless the
legislature also amends its laws to include the term "committed rela-
tionship" or "partner" wherever there is a reference to "spouse," regis-
tered partners will not receive the same benefits as married
couples. 2 8 2 By not including registered partners in its definition of
spouse, the Colorado legislature is not giving individuals in commit-
ted relationships as many rights as married couples. Instead, the legis-
lature is picking and choosing the specific areas of law it feels should
be extended to include domestic partners.
E. A More Comprehensive Approach
Although the proposals just examined show a commitment to
granting nonmarital couples intestacy rights, they are one-sided, fo-
cusing on either homosexual couples or heterosexual domestic part-
ners. Granting all surviving partners, whether homosexual or
heterosexual, the right to inherit from a decedent partner would fur-
ther the goals of intestate succession more than simply extending
rights to one or the other of these two groups.
This Note proposes that legislatures adopt a more comprehensive
approach, whereby all couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex,
have the option of either filing as domestic partners or marrying their
partner. While this "choice approach" would evoke policy repercus-
sions, it would also best effectuate the goals of intestacy law.
Under this "choice approach," the extent of couples' rights and
obligations are contingent on whether they marry, register as a com-
mitted couple, or do nothing. This proposal would affect not only the
rights of individuals under intestacy laws, but also how couples termi-
nate their relationships. For example, under this approach, those
who file as domestic partners may more readily terminate their rela-
tionship than couples who marry.
This proposal is based on a functional definition of family. It rec-
ognizes variations in family relationships, commitments, and obliga-
tions. It also acknowledges that not all couples wish to implicate the
institution of marriage, yet they still want legal validation of their rela-
tionship. My approach would give couples options in defining their
relationship and allow them to dictate more precisely their mutual
rights and responsibilities under the law. In addition to marriage,
committed couples could choose domestic partnership status, thus en-
281 See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. it. 31, § 572C-1 (Michie 1999).
282 See COLORADO REPoRT, supra note 197, at IV-3.
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suring legal recognition of their relationship without implicating all of
the obligations of marriage.
Under both the filing system and marriage, partners and spouses
would be able to recover under intestacy laws. However, a surviving
partner would be entitled to a smaller percentage of an estate than a
surviving spouse. Since all couples, whether same- or opposite-sex,
would have the option of either marrying or registering, those couples
choosing to register would be implicitly accepting the difference in
inheritance portions. Thus, while the "choice approach" grants a sur-
viving partner a smaller percentage than a surviving spouse, it estab-
lishes an intestate right where none existed before and appropriately
reflects a couples' choice of partnership over marriage.
This approach would not eliminate all problems, however.
Should a committed couple fail to sign a declaration, a surviving part-
ner would not be able to seek judicial remedy from the intestacy laws.
Conversely, a significant benefit of this system would be a decrease in
litigation concerning which committed partners are entitled to intes-
tacy rights; only registered domestic partners would have such rights.
This proposal eliminates the risk of a committed relationship going
unrecognized, as is possible in Waggoner's discretionary proposal. Fi-
nally, this "choice approach" eliminates the risk that family members
of the decedent will attempt to undermine the surviving partner's
right to inherit, because such rights would be guaranteed by law. In
addition, because of the black-letter nature of this proposal, the views
of individual judges would not affect who is defined as a committed
partner.
This "choice approach" would also better recognize the variant
forms of family now prevalent in our society. By giving all couples the
option of both domestic partnership registration and marriage, this
approach provides legal validation for all committed couples. Regis-
tered couples would be considered legal parallels of married couples,
adding legitimacy to different forms of "family."
By greatly increasing the legal recognition of nonmarital relation-
ships, the judicial enforcement of wills and will substitutes would also
be effected. Courts would entertain fewer cases involving allegations
of undue influence by a surviving partner since, assuming the relation-
ship was registered, the surviving partner would be guaranteed a por-
tion of the decedent's estate.
A final advantage of the "choice system" is that by legally guaran-
teeing the intestacy rights of married and registered partners, part-
ners will not have to hire a lawyer to ensure the testementary rights of
their loved one.
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CONCLUSION
The main goal of intestacy statutes is to further a decedent's likely
donative intent. For individuals who, for whatever reason, fail to
make a will, intestacy statutes are designed to ensure the decedent's
family receives the estate. A functional definition of family best ac-
complishes this policy by recognizing emotional and intimate relation-
ships that exist outside the traditional nuclear family. A functional
definition of family likewise supports the right of surviving, committed
partners, like surviving spouses, to inherit, even when the decedent
partner fails to make a will. To best achieve the goal of reflecting a
decedent's likely donative intent, current probate codes must be ex-
panded to include sufficiently committed partners.
State legislatures should draft laws that "reflect the popular con-
victions as to the 'proper' distribution of a dead [person's] prop-
erty."2 83 This Note has shown that current probate codes are
outdated. While at one point they reflected the "popular traditions of
their time and place,"2 84 these codes no longer "express present
American convictions."2 85 The public supports extending intestacy
provisions to include those in committed relationships. This Note ex-
amined several approaches to granting these rights, and while none is
ideal, each furthers probate law objectives, especially the fulfillment of
a decedent's donative intent. As one commentator eloquently stated
"[w]here the non-traditional family is concerned, social evolution has
outpaced legal evolution. The laws that protected the traditional fam-
ily in the past no longer provide adequate protection for the justifi-
able expectations of today's non-traditional family members."286
Thus, in order to eliminate inconsistent and inadequate intestacy
laws, legislatures should amend current probate codes to include un-
married, committed couples.
283 RHEINSTEIN & GLENDON, supra note 23, at 24.
284 Id. at 25.
285 Id.
286 Lovas, supra note 2, at 395.
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